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Evidence-NEWSMAN'SPRIVILEGE-LEGISLATIVELY
ENACTED
PRIVILEGE
INVALID
AS INFRINGEMENT
ON JUDICIAL
RULENEWSMAN'S
MAKING POWER-Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551
P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976).
The plaintiffs in this case sought recovery from the defendants for allegedly slanderous radio broadcasts. The district court
ordered the defendants to disclose the names of all their claimed
confidential informants and to produce, or make available to
plaintiffs, all information defendants claimed to have received
from those informants. The defendants appealed the order pursuant to a provision of the New Mexico newsman's privilege statute.' The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the
grounds that the statutory provision under which the appeal was
taken was unconstitutional. At the request of the district court,
the question of the constitutionality of the appellate procedure
and the broader question of the constitutionality of the newsman's privilege itself were briefed for review.' The supreme court
dismissed the appeal, holding that the privilege in general was
invalid in judicial proceedings and that the statute's appeal provision was largely i n ~ a l i d . ~

A. General Overview
Although hotly debated a few decades

the question of

1. N.M. STAT.ANN.8 20-1-12.1(C) (Supp. 1975):
If the proceeding in which disclosure is sought is in the district court, that
court will determine whether disclosure is essential to prevent injustice. . . .
Disclosure shall, in no event, be ordered except upon written order of the district
court stating the reasons why disclosure is essential to prevent injustice. Such
an order is appealable to the Supreme Court if the appeal is docketed in that
court within ten [lo] days after its entry. . . and shall be heard de novo . . . .
2. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1356 (N.M. 1976).
3. Id. This case note will only deal with the issue of the constitutionality of the
privilege itself, and not with the issue of the validity of the appeal procedure.
4. Stein, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules
of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 639, 645 (1940); see Gertner, The Inherent Power of Courts to
Make Rules, 10 U. CIN.L. REV.32, 58 (1936); Hibschman, The Power to Regulate Court
Procedure-Is It a Legislative or a Judicial Function?, 71 UNITEDSTATESL. REV. 618
(1937); Pound, The Rule-making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926); Sunderland,

.

Character and Extent of the Rule-making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404 (1935); Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-making
Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936); Wigmore, All Legislative
Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). Two
exhaustive lists of sources may be found in Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule

494

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1977:

whether the judiciary has or should be given power to make rules
of procedure has long been resolved, generally in the courts'
favor? The methods or doctrines, however, used to support or
implement this result have varied from state to state. Generally,
courts have claimed rulemaking authority upon one of three
bases: (1) an historically existing, inherent judicial power to promulgate procedural rules;6 (2) an enabling act passed by the legislature authorizing the courts to make rules of procedure;' or (3)
a constitutional provision specifically delegating to the supreme
court the right to create procedural rules for judicial proceedings?
1. Rulemaking as an inherent power of the courts

Dean Roscoe Pound, an early twentieth century champion of
the theory that courts have inherent rulemaking power, outlined
three rationales in support of the theory? First, Pound maintained that at the time the American Constitution was adopted,
the King's Court in England had power to make general rules of
procedure, and American courts inherited this power, although it
remained dormant for many years. During this period of dormancy, the rulemaking power was exercised by legislatures as
they enacted codes and practice acts. This period of judicial apathy, however, did not negate the courts' inherent power.1° Second,
Pound reasoned that in making its own procedural rules a court
can formulate and discard rules as it deems necessary. Because
of the particularized way it reacts to each case, a court is better
suited than a legislature to deal with procedural matters. Courts
need this inherent flexibility in order to effectively perform their
duties? Third, Dean Pound observed that the rules governing the
operation of a governmental branch ought to be made by that
branch. The judiciary knows best what rules are necessary and
appropriate for the judicial process and thus is best suited to
formulate those rules. l2
Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34, 54-55 app. (1948), and The Rule-making Power: A
Bibliography, 16 A.B.A.J. 199, 199-202 (1930).
5. Stein, supra note 4, at 645.
6. See People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934);Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338,
339 (1883).
7. See State ex rel. Wilson v. County Court, 145 W. Va. 435, 114 S.E.2d 904, 909
(1960); Fleming v. Dent, 120 W. Va. 691, 693-94, 200 S.E. 35, 36 (1938).
8. See Buscaino v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474,478-79, 189 N.W.2d 202, 204 (1971);Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274, 276, 61 N.W.2d 102, 103 (1953).
9. Pound, supra note 4.
10. Id. at 601-02; see Curd, supra note 4, at 38-39.
11. Pound, supra note 4, at 602-03.
12. Id.
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2. Rulemaking as a statutory power

Legislative acts, delegating to the jurisdiction's highest court
the power to regulate procedure in its own and all lower court
proceedings, are a second basis for judicial rulemaking authority.
Such an enabling act may indicate that the authority is to be
exercised exclusively by the court13or concurrently with the legislature." It may also prescribe the status of former statutory rules
of procedure.l5
3. Rulemaking as a constitutional power

An express mandate in the form of a state constitutional
provision is another ground upon which some courts have been
able to claim rulemaking power? When rulemaking authority is
based on a constitutional provision, arguments against vesting
the authority in the judiciary, such as judicial usurpation of a
legislative function and the unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, lose their cogency.17Occasionally, when an express
constitutional mandate for rulemaking is absent, courts have bolstered assertions of implied constitutional power with arguments
of inherent power.la

The supreme court of appeals may, from time to time make and promulgate
general rules and regulations governing pleading, practice and procedure in such
court and in all other courts of record of this State. All statutes relating to
pleading, practice and procedure shall have force and effect only as rules of court
and shall remain in effect unless and until modified, suspended or annulled by
rules promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section. . . .

....

. . . When and as the rules of the court herein authorized shall be prescribed,
adopted, and promulgated, all laws and parts of laws that conflict therewith
shall be and become of no further force or effect, to the extent of such conflict.
14. For a discussion of those jurisdictions that had statutory or constitutional limitations on judicial rulemaking, see Paul, The Rule-making Power of the Courts, 1WASH.L.
REV. 163, 176-80 (1926). Since 1926, however, most of these jurisdictions have removed or
lessened those restrictions.
15. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.ANN. 4 21-3-2 (1953).
16. E.g., MICH.CONST.art. VI, 4 5: "The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state."
See note 8 supra.
17. See Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND.L. REV.
467, 483 (1957); Peterson, Rule Making in Colorado: An Unheralded Crisis in Procedural
Reform, 38 U . COLO.L. REV. 137, 149-64 (1966).
18. E.g.., State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008
(1975).
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B. Rulemaking in New Mexico
In 1933 the New Mexico legislature passed an enabling act
declaring that New Mexico's Surpeme Court had the power to
regulate the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial
proceedings of all the courts of New Mexico.19 Section 2 of this
act specified that previous statutory procedural rules and subsequent legislative acts would become rules of the court unless suspended or modified by the court.
In State v. Roy,20the supreme court first interpreted the
enabling act. The court stated that the act was not a grant of
power to the court, but rather a legislative declaration of abdication from the field of procedural ~ l e m a k i n gFollowing
.~~
Roy, the
court reaffirmed its position that it had inherent and implied
constitutional power to promulgate procedural rules. 22 Finally, in
, ~ ~court held that the power to prescribe
Anaya v. M ~ B r i d e the
procedural rules was vested exclusively in the judiciary and that
any statutory attempt to enact such rules would not be binding.z4
The court pointed to its constitutional, supervisory authority over
inferior courtsz5and reasoned that the grant carried with it the
inherent power to make procedural rules? Thus, in light of the
19. 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 84, § § 1-2 (codified a t N.M. STAT.ANN. § § 21-3-1, -2 (1953)):
The Supreme Court of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated by it from
time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings
in all courts of New Mexico for the purpose of simplifying and promoting the
speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. Such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant.

....

All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure, now existing,
shall, from and after the passage of this act, have force and effect only as rules
of court and shall remain in effect unless and until modified or suspended by
rules promulgated pursuant hereto.
20. 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
21. Id. at 419, 60 P.2d at 660. The court concluded that "[wlhen the legislature
enacted chapter 84, it merely withdrew from a field wherein it had functioned as a coordinate branch of our government with the court in the promulgation of rules of pleading,
practice, and procedure." Id. Finding that the New Mexico Constitution's grant of supervisory authority over lower courts meant that it must have rulemaking power, the court
asserted that it had both constitutional and inherent power to promulgate procedural
rules. Id. at 421-22, 60 P.2d at 661-62.
22. State v. Gunzelman, 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973); Alexander v. Delgado, 84
N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973); Sitta v. Zinn, 77 N.M. 146, 420 P.2d 131 (1966); State v.
Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947); City of Roswell v. Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d
701 (1939).
23. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
24. Id. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008.
25. N.M. CONST.art. 6, 8 3: "The Supreme Court . . . shall have a superintending
control over all inferior courts . . . ."
26. 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008.
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1933 enabling act, Roy, its progeny, and McBride, it seems clear
that the New Mexico Supreme Court has rulemaking power and
that this power may be excl~sive.~'

C . Rulemaking and the Substanee-Procedure Dichotomy
Even though it may have exclusive power to make procedural
rules, a state supreme court has no rulemaking authority with
respect to substantive matters. It is therefore critical to a discussion of rulemaking power to distinguish between procedural and
substantive matters. Although the line between substance and
procedure is difficult to draw,28the distinction has been made in
some
The distinction is important in differentiating between legislative and judicial responsibilitie~.~~
In this context, the legislature is viewed as being empowered to create the substantive
rights of individuals and the judiciary is considered as having the
power to enforce those rights by means of rules promulgated to
that end. Thus, the legislature is to enact laws "which have for
their purpose to determine the rights and duties of the individual
and to regulate his conduct and relation with the government and
other individuals," and the judiciary is to formulate rules "which
have for their purpose merely to prescribe machinery and methods to be employed in enforcing these positive provision^."^^
The substance-procedure dichotomy and the resulting division between legislative and judicial responsibilities and powers
is particularly confusing in the area of the law of evidence. Although rules governing the admission or exclusion of evidence
seem to be procedural in nature, certain evidentiary rules are
substantive declarations of policy because of their inextricable
involvement with legal rights and duties. Such rules are probably
beyond a court's rulemaking power.32
27. See Curd, supra note 4, at 36.
28. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); Green, To What Extent
May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482
(1940).
29. The distinction between substance and procedure has perhaps been most important in the area of choice of laws. The determination whether a given rule is substantive
or procedural is vital to a decision whether to apply federal or state law in a federal
diversity action. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30. See Green, supm note 28, at 483-86; Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and
Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH.L. REV. 623, 653 (1957).
31. Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 605 n.31 (1940).
32. 3 J. HONIGMAN
& C. HAWKINS,
MICH.CT.RULES
ANN.403 (2d ed. 1965). Honigman
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Of various evidentiary rules," privileges appear to be more
substantive than procedural. Because they represent both considerations of public policy that are extrinsic to judicial concerns of
evidence preservation and policy determinations that the fostering of certain relationships is preferable to the orderly dispatch,~~
are substantive declarations of cering of l i t i g a t i ~ nprivileges
tain individual's rights, vesting in these persons rights not otherwise possessed. As has been noted:
While framed as rules of evidence, [privileges] are not based
upon policies concerned with the reliability or relevance of proof
or the orderly dispatch of judicial business. Rather thay are
concerned with the interests to be served by encouraging uninhibited action within the particular situation or relationship. The
advancement of the privileged interest is declared more important that the availability of one item of proof in the course of
litigati~n.~~

In the instant case, the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned
that the statute enacting the newsman's privilege "did nothing
more nor less than attempt to create a rule of evidence, comparable to other privilege^."^^ Citing Professor Edmund Morgan's rationale for categorizing privileges as evidentiary rules within the
court's rulemaking power,37the court asserted that there was "no
and Hawkins refer specifically to the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds as
examples of rules that appear to be procedural and evidentiary while actually being
substantive in nature. For example, the parol evidence rule operates as a substantive rule
of contract law marking the bounds of what constitutes a contract between parties and
defining their duties and rights. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
# 239, Comment a (1973); Green, supra note 28, at 484. Although having procedural aspects similar
to the parol evidence rule in that it operates to exclude evidence, the Statute of Frauds is
also substantive in nature because it guides people in the formation of contracts and
defines certain essential contractual elements.
33. Burden of proof requirements, true evidentiary rules, may also be more substantive than procedural. These requirements provide a method of assuring the orderly presentation of evidence at trial. See Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS
L. REV. 541, 572 & n.123 (1956); Green, supra note 28, at 484. In the sense that judicial
action cannot be taken unless the proof rises to a certain level, however, a substantive
right and duty are constituted by burden of proof rules.
& C. HAWKINS,
supra note 32, at 403-04; Joiner & Miller, supra
34. 3 J . HONIGMAN
note 30, a t 651; Riedl, supra note 31, at 604. But see Clapp, supra note 33, at 569-71;
Morgan, supra note 17, at 483-84; Stein, supra note 4, at 646. See generally Levin &
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U . PA. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1958).
& C. HAWKINS,
supra note 32, a t 403-04.
35. 3 J. HONIGMAN
36. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1356 (N.M. 1976).
37. Id. a t 1357.
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real question about rules of privilege being rules of e v i d e n ~ e . " ~ ~
While cautioning that the line between procedural and substantive matters was elusive, the court concluded that the rules of
evidence are "very largely, if not entirely, procedural" because of
their function in the judicial process.39Pointing to the adoption
of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, the court declared that the
Rules must be procedural because the court had power only to
promulgate procedural rules.40
Having decided that the privilege was procedural, the court
turned to the question of which governmental branch had the
authority to prescribe procedural rules. Reviewing the line of
cases beginning with Roy, the court concluded that the exclusive
power to prescribe procedural rules was vested in the judiciary.
Observing that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence specifically
exclude any privilege not expressly granted therein, the court
held that the legislatively enacted newsman's privilege was invalid in judicial proceedings4' because no legislative enactment
could conflict with the judicially promulgated procedural rules.42

A. Privileges-Su bstantive or Procedural?
Essential to the court's conclusion in the instant case was the
reasoning that all rules of evidence are procedural. Clearly, the
court was correct in characterizing privileges, including the newsman's privilege, as rules of evidence." Less supportable, however,
is the court's assertion that rules of evidence are procedural.
In light of scholarly views noting the substantive nature of
some rules of evidence, including privileges, it would have been
proper for the court in the instant case to have entertained some
doubt as to whether the newsman's privilege was a procedural
rule. The court, however, never questioned its general determina-

--

38. Id. at 1356.
39. Id. at 1357. Quoting from McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,41(1924), the court
stated that "rules of evidence do no more than regulate the method of proceeding by which
substantive duties are determined."
40. 551 P.2d at 1357.
41. The question of the statute's validity with respect to legislative, executive, or
administrative proceedings was not before the court. Id. at 1359.
42. Id. at 1357-60.
43. See 3 S. GARD,JONESON EVIDENCE,
CML AND CRIMINAL
4 21:1, at 744 (6th ed.
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF EVIDENCE
4 72, a t 151 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); MCCORMICK'S
1972); 1J. THAYER,
A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON
LAW264 (1898);
EVIDENCE
4 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
8 J. WIGMORE,
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tion that the privilege, as a rule of evidence, must be procedural.
Failing to discuss the possibility that substantive rights had been
vested in newsmen by the statute, the court bluntly and summarily concluded that all privileges are procedural.
The authorities cited by the court to support its reasoning are
not conclusive. Only one, Judge Alfred C. Clapp writing in 1956,
unconditionally takes the position that all privileges are procedural." In citing Professor Morgan for the proposition that privileges are within the court's rulemaking authority, the court failed
to consider his caveat. According to Morgan, a court may not
abrogate a legislatively enacted common law privilege even
though it was originally created by court decision.45
Moreover, the previous New Mexico case law does not support the result reached by the court in the instant case. For example, in Kreigh v. State Bank,46the court indicated that certain
legislation modifying burden of proof requirements was valid.
Although the court's reasoning in Kreigh is unclear, it is difficult
to reconcile the case with the disparate result in the instant case.
If the Kreigh court refused to disturb the legislatively enacted
burden of proof, which it termed a rule of evidence,'' because it
was a substantive matter, then the result in the instant case is
disturbing. Because burden of proof requirements are more
clearly associated with the orderly dispatch of justice, normally
the touchstone in distinguishing between substance and procedure, than are privilege^,^^ Kreigh would indicate that privileges
are substantive matters within the legislature's power to adopt or
modify. If, however, the Kreigh court decided that the burden of
proof was a procedural matter, then the case must stand for the
44. Clapp, supra note 33, at 570-71. Clapp pointed to Justice Brandeis' dicta in
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924), that the privilege against selfincrimination "relates to the adjective law." Thus, reasoned Clapp, "if this privilege
against self-incrimination is procedural, then there can be no doubt as to other privileges,
and indeed all rules of evidence, are also procedural." Clapp, supra note 33, at 570-71.
Clapp's line of argument fails to note that the fifth amendment privilege is founded
on different policies than are other privileges. The privilege against self-incrimination
governs an individual's relationship with the courts, not with other individuals. A newsman's privilege, however, fosters a nonjudicial relationship-the uninhibited flow of information between a newsman and his sources. See Carter, The Journalist, His Informant
and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1111 (1960).
45. Morgan states that the "so-called common law privileges of witnesses were created by judicial decision . . . and in the absence of statute, can be disregarded or abolished
by judicial decision." Morgan, supra note 17, at 483 (emphasis added).
46. 37 N.M. 360, 23 P.2d 1085 (1933).
47. Id. at 367, 23 P.2d at 1089.
48. See note 33 supra.
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proposition that the New Mexico legislature has concurrent authority with the court even as to procedural matters.49Thus, if the
legislature could properly modify a burden of proof requirement,
it could also add to the privileges granted to witnesses.
A later New Mexico case cited by the court, State u. Arnold,5n
also does not support the result reached in the instant case.
Arnold was cited for the proposition that legislatively enacted
procedural rules that conflict with judicially promulgated rules
must yield to the latter. In Arnold, the court was faced with a
statute that directly conflicted with a court rule limiting the appeal time in civil actions.51The instant case, however, did not
involve inconsistent procedural rules. The only possible conflict
of the newsman's privilege is with Rule 501 of the New Mexico
evidentiary rules, which provides that no privileges are to be recognized except as required by the constitution, the other rules of
evidence, or rules adopted by the supreme court.52Because it
conflicts with no other privilege in the Rules, the newsman's privilege conflicts with Rule 501 only by negative implication, if at
all." Because a legislative enactment of a substantive nature does
not upset other positive rules established by the court, there may
in fact be no conflict with Rule 501.
Finally, by referring to the adoption of the New Mexico Rules
of Evidence for support of the conclusion that the newsman's
privilege was procedural and therefore within its exclusive power,
the court resorted to circular reasoning based upon labelling.
Since it had properly promulgated the Rules, the court argued,
then those Rules, including privileges, must be procedural. Thus,
the court declared, the newsman's privilege was a procedural rule
within the court's sole adoptive power. Again the court's reasoning is clearly faulty, for, as noted above, not all rules of evidence
are procedural.
If the controverted newsman's privilege is substantive rather
than procedural, the New Mexico Supreme Court should have
49. This would directly contradict the holding in Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244,
539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
50. 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947).
51. Id. at 314-15, 183 P.2d at 846-47.
52. N.M. STAT.ANN. 5 20-4-501 (Supp. 1975): "Except as otherwise required by
constitution, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by the
Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to: (1) Refuse to be a witness; or (2) Refuse to
disclose any matter; or (3) Refuse to produce any object or writing . . . ."
53. The conflict exists, the court apparently believed, because the Rules are comprehensive. See 551 P.2d at 1359.
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recognized that the legislative enactment was constitutionally
authorized. The court instead used a mechanical approach to
label all privileges as rules of evidence and to define all rules of
evidence as being procedural. The court simply used the terms
"procedural" and "substantive" to give a result, not a reason.
B. Rulemaking and the Balance of Legislative and Judicial
Power
1. Rules in the "twilight zone" between substance and
procedure

The court in the instant case recognized that the line between substance and procedure is an elusive one?' The court,
however, failed to discuss the question of which governmental
branch-the legislature or the judiciary-should appropriately
make the determination.
The New Mexico Supreme Court had earlier addressed the
, ~ ~ Justice
question. In Southwest Underwriters v. M ~ n t o y aChief
Noble, writing for the court, stated:
The distinction between substantive law and those rules of
pleading, practice and procedure which are essential to the performance of the constitutional duties imposed upon the courts
is not always clearly defined. There may be areas in which procedural matters so closely border upon substantive rights and
remedies that legislative enactments with respect thereto would
be proper.56

If not clearly substantive rules, privileges certainly qualify as
rules that border closely upon substantive rights. Indeed, because
it establishes and attempts to foster a nonjudicial relationship of
confidentiality between a newsman and his sources, the newsman's privilege in question borders closely upon substantive
rights. Thus, under Noble's formulation, the privilege would be
proper for legislative enactment.
Charles Anthony Riedl has also explained the reason for
empowering the legislature to deal with substance-procedure determinations:
As to those rules which may fall in the "twilight zone," the
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the legislature, because all
-

-

-

54. Id. at 1357.

55. 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969).
56. Id. at 109, 452 P.2d at 178 (dicta).
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power not essential to the independent exercise of its constitutional function by one of the three departments of government
is vested in the legislature by virtue of it being the law making
department .57

Application of Riedl's formulation yields the same result as
does application of Noble's language-the conclusion that the
newsman's privilege was appropriate for legislative enactment.
Because it can hardly be asserted that the exclusive power to
enact a newsman's privilege is necessary for the court in order to
exercise its constitutional supervisory power over lower courts,
the legislature could properly enact the questioned privilege,
since, under Riedl's test, it fell within the "twilight zone." Thus,
under either formulation, the legislature could enact the privilege
in question because it clearly borders on substantive rights and
does not involve matters necessary for the fulfillment of the
court's constitutional functions.58
2. Public policy decisions as the legislative domain

As a test for determining whether an evidentiary rule should
be created by the court or by the legislature, one commentator
has suggested the following:
The test we propose is whether a given rule of evidence is a
device with which to promote the adequate, simple, prompt and
inexpensive administration of justice in the conduct of a trial or
whether the rule, having nothing to do with procedure, is
grounded upon a declaration of a general public policy.
. . .If the rule is an expression of general public policy, then
it can be prescribed only by the legislature.59

A reading of the New Mexico statute reveals that the legislature made a policy decision in favor of the newsman-informant
relationship and the uninhibited gathering of news. The statute
calls for a policy of nondisclosure on the part of the newsmen as
57. Riedl, supra note 31, at 604 (emphasis added). See also Curd, supra note 4, at
48-49; Note, The Rule Making Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone
Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U . FLA.L. REV.87 (1971).
58. The newsman's privilege was not intended to aid in what Pound termed "the
orderly dispatch of judicial business, the saving of public time, and maintenance of the
dignity of tribunals." See Wells, Criminal Sanctions Imposed Against Newsmen: Shield
Protection Needed, 2 AM.J . CRIM.L. 309, 323 (1974);Note, Newsman-Source Privilege:
A Foundation in Policy for Recognition at Common Law, 26 U . kA.L. REV.453,464,46970 (1974). See generally Comment, Journalists in the Courts: Toward Effective Shield
Legislation, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 664 (1974).
59. Riedl, supra note 31, at 604 (emphasis added).
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to their sources and their unpublished information collected in
the newsgathering process.60Furthermore, an earlier version of
the statute itself indicated that it represented a policy decision
by the legi~lature.~~
Even one of the authorities cited by the court recognized that
the privilege represents a policy decision.62P.B. Carter, in arguing
against the newsman's privilege, states that any justification for
the privilege must be found in policy. Carter characterizes the
usual policies supporting the privilege as encouragement of the
free flow of news'and respect for the "conscience" of the
journalist-confidant. Indeed, Carter points out that the privilege
inhibits the administration of court business because it blocks the
Surely the decision to favor nondisclosure a t
search for
the expense of finding truth involves a public policy decision. If,
as Carter suggests, the privilege inhibits the search for truth, then
it cannot be a rule to promote the "adequate . . . and inexpensive
administration of j~stice."'~Thus, the privilege is clearly a statute declaring public policy and not one aimed at the orderly
dispatch of judicial business.
New Mexico statutes creating privileged communications
have existed since 1880. The right of the state legislature to enact
witnesses' privileges has gone unchallenged until the instant
case.65In fact, no other case has been discovered where a court
has invalidated a legislatively created newsman's privilege?
Apparently, the New Mexico Supreme Court is alone in asserting
that the power to create such a privilege is exclusively vested in
the judiciary. In view of the fact that a t least twenty-four other
states have newsman's privilege statutes,67the court's position in
the instant case is suspect. Because the creation of the privilege
involved a determination of public policy, the legislative enact60. There is, however, a stipulation that disclosure may be required if it is essential
to prevent injustice. N.M. STAT.ANN.§ 20-1-12.1(A) (Supp. 1975).
61. N.M. STAT.ANN. § 20-1-12.1(A) (1953) (repealed 1973):
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of New Mexico that no reporter
shall be required to disclose before any proceeding or by any authority the source
of information procured by him in the course of his employment as a reporter
for a news media unless disclosure be essential to prevent injustice.
62. Carter, supra note 44, at 1121-22.
63. Id.
64. Riedl, supra note 31, at 604; Joiner & Miller, supra note 30, at 635.
65. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 7, Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.,
551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9, 17-19. See Wells, supra note 58, at 323-28.
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ment should have been upheld." In invalidating the statute, the
court violated a long-standing maxim that the judiciary should
not strike down a statute unless the court was completely satisfied that the legislature had acted beyond its constitutional limi t ~ . ~ ~
IV. CONCLUSION
In reaching the conclusion that the legislatively enacted
newsman's privilege was an unconstitutional infringement on its
power to promulgate procedural rules, the New Mexico Supreme
Court used a mechanical lockstep approach. While correctly categorizing the privilege as an evidentiary rule, the court incorrectly
decided that all rules of evidence are procedural and thus within
the court's exclusive power to promulgate. In so doing, the court
failed to consider substantive aspects of the privilege that made
it appropriate for legislative enactment.
68. Typical of the language of courts which have dealt with the issue is this from an
Alabama federal district court:
It is not a matter of judicial concern that the Legislature of Alabama was
either prudent or unwise in clothing the sources of a journalist's information
with secrecy. So far as this is concerned, the public policy of the State of
Alabama in this regard was crystallized by enactment of the statute involved.

Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
69. Hovey Concrete Prod. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 251-52, 316 P.2d 1069, 1070
(1957).

